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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jeremy Raymond Scruggs pleaded guilty to misdemeanor battery on a police
officer, Deputy Bradley Germann. The magistrate court found that Scruggs’ criminal
conduct caused Deputy Germann to suffer a knee injury and ordered Scruggs to pay
restitution for expenses associated with that injury. On intermediate appeal to the district
court, Scruggs claimed that the magistrate court erred in concluding that the injury to
Deputy Germann was caused by his criminal conduct, arguing that the battery could not
have caused the injury to Deputy Germann because the injury occurred while Deputy
Germann was attempting to restrain Scruggs after the battery was complete. The district
court disagreed, holding that substantial evidence supported the magistrate court’s
conclusion that, while the injury occurred after the battery and when Deputy Germann
was attempting to restrain Scruggs, it would not have occurred but for the battery and was
a reasonably foreseeable result of that conduct. Scruggs timely appealed and makes the
same argument here.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Bradley Germann was working as a patrolman with the Gooding County Sheriff’s
Office on July 14, 2017, when he received a call at around 11:45 P.M. regarding a fight
in a parking lot in Wendell, Idaho, and reported to the scene. (Tr., p.5, L.15 – p.6, L.6.)
He observed two men standing near a Subway restaurant and another group of people
standing some distance away. (Tr., p.6, Ls.7-21.) Pointing towards the two men standing
near the restaurant, one member of this latter group stated, “‘He just punched me in the
face.’” (Id.) One of the men near the restaurant, later identified as the Defendant1

Appellant, Jeremy Scruggs, was “getting loose” from the other man who was “holding
him back.” (Id.)
When Scruggs broke free of the man holding him back, he charged toward
Deputy Germann, who removed his Taser from its holster, pointed it at Scruggs, and
instructed him to stop. (Tr., p.6, Ls.17-25; p.11, Ls.3-16.) Scruggs continued to charge
at Deputy Germann and hit the Taser out of Deputy Germann’s hand. (Tr., p.7, Ls.3-5.)
Deputy Germann immediately attempted to restrain Scruggs by gaining control of his
hands. (Tr., p.7, Ls.6-19; p.16, Ls.12-18.) While he had a hold of Scruggs’ left hand, he
was attempting to reach behind Scruggs to secure his other hand when Deputy
Germann’s “knee blew out,” with Deputy Germann suffering a patellar dislocation. (Tr.,
p.7, Ls.6-23; p.10, L.10 – p.11, L.2.) That injury later required surgery and Deputy
Germann was out of work for several months. (Tr., p.9, Ls.4-24.)
Scruggs was charged with misdemeanor battery on a police/peace officer under
Idaho Code sections 18-915(3) and 18-903(b). (R., pp.9-10.) The Complaint alleged that
Scruggs “intentionally and unlawfully touched the person of Deputy Bradley Germann,
Gooding County Sheriff’s Office, against his will by pushing Deputy Germann, and/or
knocking Deputy Bradley Germann’s taser from his hand.” 1 (Id.) Scruggs later pleaded
guilty. (R., pp.41, 50.)
The Idaho State Insurance Fund sought restitution for expenses associated with
the injury to Deputy Germann’s knee, including medical expenses and time lost from
work. (R., pp.45-46.) The magistrate court held a restitution hearing at which only
Deputy Germann testified and at which records from the Idaho State Insurance Fund

1

Deputy Germann testified that Scruggs did not push him. (Tr., p.16, Ls.7-11.)
2

documenting Deputy Germann’s medical expenses and lost wages were introduced
without objection. (Tr., p.4, Ls.13-18.) Scruggs argued, inter alia, that restitution was
improper because he pleaded guilty to battery, while the evidence showed that the injury
to Deputy Germann’s knee occurred after that battery while Deputy Germann was
attempting to restrain Scruggs. 2 (Tr., p.24, L.16 – p.29, L.9.) The magistrate court
disagreed, finding that the battery caused the injury because, while Deputy Germann was
injured while attempting to restrain Scruggs, he was attempting to restrain Scruggs only
because of the battery, and the injury associated with his attempt to restrain Scruggs was
reasonably foreseeable in light of the battery. (Tr., p.31, Ls.12-19.) The magistrate court
then entered an Order for Restitution. (R., pp.42-43.)
Scruggs timely filed an intermediate appeal of that determination to the district
court (R., pp.56-58), arguing only that the magistrate court erred in concluding that the
injury to Deputy Germann’s knee was caused by the criminal conduct to which Scruggs
pleaded guilty (R., pp.66-75). The district court disagreed, affirming the Order for
Restitution in a Memorandum of Decision on Appeal. (R., pp.95-108.) After carefully
reviewing the facts and associated case law, the district court agreed with the magistrate
court that, while the injury occurred after the charged battery when Deputy Germann was
attempting to restrain Scruggs, the injury would not have occurred but for the battery and

2

Scruggs presented two additional arguments before the magistrate court: (1) that
Deputy Germann’s knee injury was either wholly or partially pre-existing (Tr., p.17, L.25
– p.22, L.10), and (2) that the state failed to present adequate evidence regarding the
amount of restitution (Tr., p.22, L.11 – p.24, L.15). He made neither argument on
intermediate appeal to the district court (R., pp.66-75), and makes neither on appeal to
this Court (See generally Appellant’s brief). They are therefore waived. See Hodge for
& on behalf of Welch v. Waggoner, 164 Idaho 89, 425 P.3d 1232, 1239 n.9 (2018)
(holding that arguments not raised in the opening brief on appeal are waived, as are
arguments not raised below).
3

was reasonably foreseeable in light of that conduct.
Scruggs timely appealed to this Court. (R., pp.112-15.)

4

(R., pp.101-02, 104, 106-07.)

ISSUE
Scruggs states the issue on appeal as:
1.

Did the District Court err in upholding the order of restitution as
consistent with relevant legal standards and supported by
substantial evidence that Germann’s injury resulted from the
criminal conduct to which Scruggs pleaded guilty?

(Appellant’s brief, p.2.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
1.

Has Scruggs failed to show that there is no substantial evidence supporting the
district court’s conclusion that Deputy Germann’s injury was caused by Scruggs’
criminal conduct for purposes of Idaho’s restitution statute?

5

ARGUMENT
Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court’s Determination That The Criminal
Conduct With Which Scruggs Was Charged Caused Deputy Germann’s Injury
A.

Introduction
Scruggs argues that his criminal conduct could not have caused the injury to

Deputy Germann’s knee because “the crime to which Scruggs pleaded guilty, battery,
was committed and over at the time Germann injured his knee.” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.)
“At the time Germann injured his knee Scruggs’ actions could only be construed as
resisting an arrest. Scruggs pleaded guilty to battery for hitting the taser and was not
charged with resisting arrest; so there is no causal connection between the crime proven
and any economic loss.” (Id.) That is, Scruggs argues that the battery could not have
caused the injury to Deputy Germann’s knee because Deputy Germann was not injured
exactly when Scruggs committed battery, but was instead injured moments later when
Deputy Germann was attempting to restrain Scruggs as a result of that crime.
Scruggs’ argument is directly contrary to Idaho law.

As the district court

understood, and as Idaho’s appellate courts have repeatedly held, the relevant question
for purposes of causation is not whether Deputy Germann’s injury directly and
automatically resulted from the criminal conduct to which Scruggs pleaded guilty, with
no other events or decisions contributing. Rather, the relevant question is whether the
injury would not have occurred but for the criminal conduct and was a reasonably
foreseeable result of that conduct, even where other decisions and actions contributed.
The district court properly concluded that Deputy Germann’s injury would not have
occurred but for the battery to which Scruggs pleaded guilty and was reasonably
foreseeable in light of that conduct.
6

B.

Standard Of Review
“On appeal from a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court’s decision.” State v.
Chernobieff, 161 Idaho 537, 539, 387 P.3d 790, 792 (2016) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[W]hether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the district
court’s discretion and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code
section 19-5304(7).” State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011).
“The issue of causation in restitution cases is a question of fact to be decided by the trial
court.” Id. “The district court’s factual findings with regard to restitution will not be
disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” Id. “Substantial evidence is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” State
v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013).

C.

The District Court’s Conclusion That Scruggs’ Criminal Conduct Caused The
Injury To Deputy Germann’s Knee Is Supported By Substantial Evidence
Scruggs argues on appeal that there was “no causal connection between Scruggs

hitting Germann’s hand and Germann’s knee injury” because the battery was complete
before the injury occurred and the injury is more directly attributable to other
events―specifically, Deputy Germann’s attempt to restrain Scruggs. (Appellant’s brief,
p.5.) Scruggs’ argument is a variation on a theme that has been repeatedly rejected by
Idaho’s appellate courts.
In State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 249 P.3d 398 (2011), the Idaho Supreme Court
articulated the law governing causation with respect to Idaho’s restitution statute, which
“permits a court to order restitution for ‘any crime which results in an economic loss to

7

the victim.’” Id. at 602, 249 P.3d at 401 (emphasis added) (quoting I.C. § 19-5304(2))
(holding that the defendant’s reckless driving and eluding police in a high speed chase
was the actual and proximate cause of injuries to a passenger who decided to jump from
the moving vehicle). “[I]n order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a causal
connection between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries
suffered by the victim.” Id. Establishing such a causal connection requires showing that
the criminal conduct was both the actual and proximate cause of the injuries. Id.
“‘Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event produced a
particular consequence.’” Id. (quoting State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374, 223 P.3d
750, 757 (2009)). When there are not two or more possible causes acting concurrently,
actual causation is governed by the “but for” test. Id. That is, the Court asks whether the
injuries would not have occurred but for the criminal conduct. Id. at 603, 249 P.3d at
402.
To determine whether criminal conduct proximately caused the injuries, the Court
must determine “whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the conduct would result in
the injuries.” Id. at 602, 249 P.3d at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted). That
question hinges on “whether the injury and manner of occurrence are so highly unusual
that a reasonable person, making an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his
conduct might produce, would not have reasonably expected the injury to occur.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). One way in which the criminal conduct may be an
actual but not proximate cause of injuries is through the action of an intervening,
superseding cause. Id. “An intervening, superseding cause is ‘an independent act or
force that breaks the causal chain between the defendant’s culpable act and the victim’s

8

injury.’” Id. at 602, 249 P.3d at 401 (quoting Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374, 223 P.3d at
757).

While the conduct of the victim of an injury may, in some circumstances,

constitute an intervening, superseding cause of that injury, “[i]n order to be considered an
intervening, superseding cause, the victim’s conduct must have been an unforeseeable
and extraordinary occurrence.” Id. at 606, 249 P.3d at 405.
In State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 271 P.3d 1243 (Ct. App. 2012), the Court of
Appeals applied the legal principles announced in Corbus to facts remarkably like those
in this case to affirm a restitution order. Cottrell pleaded guilty to obstructing a police
officer, Officer Sullivan. Id. at 390, 271 P.3d at 1246. As a result of that conduct,
“‘Officer Sullivan attempted to gain control of the Defendant and in so doing twisted his
right knee.’” Id. (quoting magistrate’s findings). Officer Sullivan’s attempt to “gain
control” of Cottrell involved “tackl[ing] Cottrell to the ground when arresting him.” Id.
at 393, 271 P.3d at 1249.

The Idaho State Insurance Fund sought and recovered

restitution for expenses associated with the knee injury, which award was appealed to the
district court in its intermediate appellate capacity, and then to the Court of Appeals. Id.
at 390, 271 P.3d at 1246. Cottrell argued that the state failed to adequately establish that
his criminal conduct caused the injury. Id. at 391, 271 P.3d at 1247.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Cottrell’s argument. First, as to actual
causation, it held that the injury would not have occurred but for Cottrell’s refusal to obey
Officer Sullivan’s instructions. Id. “Second, as to proximate cause, the magistrate found
that Officer Sullivan’s attempt to control Cottrell was a reasonable and necessary reaction
to Cottrell’s obstructive actions.” Id. Because it was reasonably foreseeable that Officer
Sullivan would respond to Cottrell’s refusal to obey commands by attempting to restrain
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him, “[i]t is no defense to say Officer Sullivan did not have to tackle Cottrell.” Id.
Cottrell’s argument that Officer Sullivan’s decision to tackle him caused the injury was
“more accurately an attempt to point to an intervening cause, meaning a voluntary act by
another that breaks the causal chain.” Id. Such an argument can be successful only if
“the victim’s conduct was unforeseeable and an extraordinary occurrence.” Id. Because
“the record show[ed] that Cottrell repeatedly dismissed Officer Sullivan’s requests for
Cottrell to cooperate and submit to arrest” and “[i]t was only after Cottrell continued to
evade Officer Sullivan that Officer Sullivan took actions to control Cottrell,” the Court of
Appeals found that “it was foreseeable that Cottrell’s conduct would elicit a physical
response from Officer Sullivan, putting Officer Sullivan in a position to injure his knee.”
Id.
Because its facts are exceptionally similar to this case and its holding adverse to
Scruggs, he is eager to distinguish Cottrell. According to Scruggs, “[t]he key difference
between Cottrell and the case at hand is in Cottrell the criminal act to which the
defendant pleaded guilty was the same act that caused the injury and subsequent
economic loss. In Cottrell there was a causal connection between the crime proven and
the economic loss.” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.) But this supposed distinction is nothing
more than a statement of his conclusion. The issue in this appeal is precisely whether
Scruggs’ battery caused Deputy Germann’s knee injury. It is unhelpful and questionbegging to “distinguish” Cottrell by simply asserting that Scruggs’ battery did not cause
the injury to Deputy Germann, while Cottrell’s criminal conduct did cause the injury to
Officer Sullivan.

10

More helpfully, perhaps, Scruggs may be suggesting that Cottrell is
distinguishable because the charged criminal conduct was “closer” in the causal chain to
the injury in that case than is the charged criminal conduct to the injury in this case. That
is, he may be suggesting that while the causal relationship between the battery in this case
and the injury to Deputy Germann is somewhat attenuated―with a decision by Deputy
Germann to restrain Scruggs dropped between the crime and the injury―the relationship
between Cottrell’s obstruction of an officer and the injury to Officer Sullivan is direct.
But that claim is false and would be irrelevant if true.
The causal relationship in Cottrell is no more direct than is the causal relationship
in this case. Cottrell’s obstruction consisted of “‘failing to put his hands behind his back
as directed by Officer Sullivan,’” “‘attempt[ing] to pull his right arm away from Officer
Sullivan,’” and “‘plung[ing] his left hand into his front left pants pocket.’” Id. at 390,
271 P.3d at 1246 (quoting findings of magistrate). “‘As a result of the Defendant’s
conduct, which amounted to the criminal offense of Obstructing, Officer Sullivan
attempted to gain control of the Defendant and in so doing twisted his right knee.’” Id.
(emphasis added) (quoting findings of magistrate).

“[T]he evidence shows it was

Cottrell’s acts of attempting to pull away from Officer Sullivan during arrest that
precipitated the need for Officer Sullivan to gain control of Cottrell and, in so doing,
twist his knee.” Id. at 393, 271 P.3d at 1249 (emphasis added). Officer Sullivan was
injured when he “tackle[d] Cottrell,” which became necessary “only after Cottrell
continued to evade Officer Sullivan.” Id. (emphasis added). Cottrell’s criminal conduct
did not cause the injury directly, but by prompting Officer Sullivan to attempt to restrain
Cottrell by tackling him, which attempt caused the injury. See State v. Eddins, 156 Idaho
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645, 651, 330 P.3d 391, 397 (Ct. App. 2014) (characterizing Cottrell as having held that,
“[a]lthough the officer was not injured directly by the conduct constituting the offense,
the criminal conduct was nonetheless the cause of the injury” (emphasis added)).
Likewise, Scruggs’ battery prompted Deputy Germann to attempt to restrain him, which
attempt caused the injury. The causal relationship between the criminal conduct and the
injury in Cottrell is no more direct than is the corresponding relationship in this case.
Second, and more importantly, it is irrelevant whether the causal relationship
between Scruggs’ criminal conduct and Deputy Germann’s knee injury is entirely direct.
What is relevant is only whether the criminal conduct is an actual and proximate cause of
the injury. The proximate cause analysis―including the question whether the victim’s
conduct constituted an intervening, superseding cause―specifically contemplates that the
causal relationship may be somewhat attenuated, and courts have repeatedly so held.
See, e.g., Lampien, 148 Idaho at 375, 223 P.3d at 758 (holding that where defendant lied
to police when asked if her husband was in her home and likely to be armed, she caused
the injuries to the officers that resulted when they entered the home and her husband
opened fire); Corbus, 150 Idaho at 606, 249 P.3d at 405 (holding that reckless driving and
eluding police caused the injury to a passenger who jumped from the moving car despite
the fact that the injury to the passenger was mediated by the passenger’s decision to do
so); Eddins, 156 Idaho at 651-52, 330 P.3d at 397-98 (holding that where the defendant
threatened to throw acid on the victim and the victim responded by pushing the
defendant, at which point the acid spilled on the victim, the threat to throw the acid
caused the victim’s injuries for purpose of restitution). The direct cause of the injuries in
Lampien was gunfire, not Lampien’s deception. The direct cause of the injury in Corbus
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was the passenger’s decision to jump from the moving vehicle, not the reckless driving.
The direct cause of the injury in Eddins was the spilling of the acid, not the threat to
throw acid. Nevertheless, in each case, the courts determined that the relevant criminal
acts were both actual and proximate causes of the injuries for purposes of Idaho’s
restitution statute.
Next, Scruggs may be suggesting that this case is distinguishable from Cottrell
because, unlike in Cottrell, Scruggs committed additional criminal conduct after the
conduct for which he was charged and to which Deputy Germann’s knee injury is
attributable. According to Scruggs, “the crime, if any, occurring at the time of the injury
was resisting and/or obstructing an officer,” a crime that was “never charged by the
state.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) Deputy Germann testified that Scruggs was “pulling
away” as he tried to restrain Scruggs immediately after the battery. (Tr., p.7, Ls.3-19.)
This argument again simply ignores the relevant analysis, which focuses on actual
and proximate causation. Even if Deputy Germann’s knee injury was attributable to
Scruggs’ pulling away as Deputy Germann attempted to restrain him, it is nevertheless
true that, but for the battery, Deputy Germann would not have needed to restrain Scruggs
and would not have been injured in an attempt to do so. Because of the battery, it was
reasonably foreseeable that Deputy Germann would attempt to restrain Scruggs and that
he could be injured in that attempt. Nor did Scruggs’ “pulling away” from Deputy
Germann constitute an intervening, superseding cause that relieves Scruggs of liability.
“[T]o relieve a defendant of criminal liability, an intervening cause must be an
unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence.” Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602-03, 249 P.3d at
401-02.

It is hardly unforeseeable and extraordinary that after charging at Deputy
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Germann, disobeying instructions to stop, and striking a Taser from Deputy Germann’s
hand, Scruggs would then pull away from Deputy Germann as he attempted to restrain
Scruggs.
The only case on which Scruggs relies to support his view that the magistrate and
district courts erred provides no support at all. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.) In State v.
Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 161 P.3d 689 (Ct. App. 2007), the Court of Appeals held that a
defendant could not be forced to pay restitution for injuries suffered in a vehicular
accident when he was not charged with causing the accident itself, but only with leaving
the scene. 3 Id. at 371, 161 P.3d at 690. Because there was no question that the injuries
were caused in the accident, which obviously occurred before Shafer left the scene, and
because responsibility for leaving the scene did not imply responsibility for the accident
itself, the charged criminal conduct “did not cause the injuries and property damage
suffered by the other driver.” Id. at 373, 161 P.3d at 692. Scruggs relies on Shafer for
the proposition that “‘a defendant cannot be required to pay restitution for damages
stemming from separate, uncharged, and unproven crimes.’” (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5
(quoting Shafer, 144 Idaho at 372, 161 P.3d at 691).)
Since Shafer was decided, courts have repeatedly emphasized the narrowness of
its holding. In Eddins, the defendant attempted to put Shafer to use in exactly the way
Scruggs does here. 156 Idaho at 651, 330 P.3d at 397. Eddins was found by a jury to
have committed an assault by threatening to do violence when he threatened to throw

3

While the Court of Appeals held that the defendant could not be forced to pay
restitution absent consent, it affirmed the district court’s order requiring the defendant to
do so because he consented to pay restitution through a plea agreement. Shafer, 144
Idaho at 375, 161 P.3d at 694.
14

acid at an individual with whom he was having an argument. Id. The jury’s verdict
suggested that it found that the victim responded to the threat by pushing Eddins, at
which point the acid spilled over both. Id. at 651-62, 330 P.3d at 397-98. On appeal
from an order requiring Eddins to pay restitution for the resulting injury, Eddins argued
that “the assault, which involved only a threat, cannot be the proximate cause of an injury
because threats do not cause physical injuries.” Id. at 650, 330 P.3d at 396. Rather,
Eddins argued, he was being asked to pay restitution based on an unproven charge of
aggravated battery for intentionally throwing the acid. Id.
The Court of Appeals rejected Eddins’ reliance on Shafer, noting the narrow
holding of that case and re-emphasizing the focus on actual and proximate causation. As
the Court of Appeals noted, in Shafer, “[t]he accident and resulting injury, by necessity,
occurred before Shafer committed the offense of leaving the scene of the accident.” Id. at
651, 330 P.3d at 397. As a result, “the victim’s injuries would have occurred irrespective
of Shafer’s later criminal conduct” and therefore “the criminal offense did not cause the
injury.” Id. By contrast, the record in Eddins did “not show that the injury would have
occurred irrespective of the culpable conduct”―Eddins’ threat to throw acid―making
Shafer “inapposite.” Id. Shafer stands for the narrow proposition that, where there is no
dispute that the injuries would have occurred irrespective of the charged criminal conduct
because the injuries occurred before the criminal conduct, that conduct was not the actual
and proximate cause of the injuries and restitution is improper. See also Cottrell, 152
Idaho at 392, 271 P.3d at 1248 (rejecting appellant’s reliance on Shafer and noting that
the reversal of the restitution award in Shafer was based on the fact that “the victim’s
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injuries occurred from the accident and prior to the criminal conduct of leaving the scene
of an accident by the defendant”).
As it was in Eddins, Shafer is inapposite here. Deputy Germann’s knee injury did
not occur prior to Scruggs’ battery, but followed that criminal conduct by mere moments
and was part of the same brief interaction and sequence of events. As with the injury in
Eddins, the record here does not show that Deputy Germann’s knee injury would have
occurred irrespective of Scruggs’ battery, but instead shows that the battery was what
required and caused Deputy Germann to attempt to restrain Scruggs, during which
attempt the injury occurred. While it is certainly true that Scruggs cannot be forced to
pay restitution for injuries that were not caused by the criminal conduct with which he
was charged, Scruggs is not being asked to do so; he is being asked to pay restitution for
injuries caused by criminal conduct with which he was charged and to which he pleaded
guilty―his battery of Deputy Germann.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order on
restitution.
DATED this 6th day of February, 2019.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of February, 2019, served a true
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JAMES LAW OFFICE, PLLC
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